New York state judicial decisions concerning the law of negotiable instruments. The common law of the New York state courts may not have been clear on the point before the Court, 8 but that was not the reason for the decision. Writing for the Court, Justice Story stated that, at least with regard to "contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature," federal diversity courts were free to follow their own best understanding of "the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence." 9 In such cases, Justice Story said, state judicial decisions to the contrary were not part of the "laws of the several states" as that term was used in the Rules of Decision Act. Hence, the Act's mandate that state laws be followed "as rules of decision" did not apply. 10 Preyer's book is about the birth, growth, and demise of the Swift doctrine. In it he examines successive attitudes about the proper relationship between the Rules of Decision Act -perplexing in and of itself1 1 -and the law and policy of diversity jurisdiction. 12 Justice Brandeis would eventually ask in Erie whether a narrow reading that excludes state judicial decisions from "laws of the several states" in the Rules of Decision Act would not put federal judges in the untoward, if not unconstitutional, 13 position of displacing state substantive law with no greater claim to authority than that their diver-8. Justice Story indicates that it was not, Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. at 17-18, and Freyer agrees. P. 12. But see G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 32 (1977) (arguing that the Court chose "to ignore an obvious solution to a simple case . . • .").
9. 41 U.S. at 19. 10. 41 U.S. at 18-19. 11. For an excellent survey of developments under the Rules of Decision Act from Swift to the present, see C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 347-87 (4th ed. 1983) . "No issue in the whole field1offederal]urisprudence has been more difficult than determining the meaning of this statute." -Id. at 347.
12. Rul~s of Decision Act problems are conceivable when federal courts are exercising other types of subject matter jurisdiction, see Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of .Decision, 11 HARv. L. REv. 1084 , 1087 (1964 , but it has always been in diversity cases that hard questions concerning the applicability of state law arise, and the difficulty of these questions is compounded by fundamental uncertainty concerning the purposes of di- Erie .Doctrine in .Diversity Cases, 61 YALE LJ. 187, 195-96 (1957) . 13. Writing of the Swift doctrine, Justice Brandeis stated: If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear and compels us to do so. 304 U.S. at 77-78. In failing to make the shape of the constitutional question clear in Erle or since, the Court created a congenial climate for spirited theorizing and debate. See, e.g., Ely,
The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693 (1974) ; Friendly, In Praise of Erieand of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383 (1964) 17. A "program of simplifying the law to bring judges under control, reduce the power of lawyers, and increase the layman's ability to understand and deal with his own legal problems [Vol. 82:869 on the court, as well as many others favoring states' rights (pp. 18-19) did.
In keeping with this view, Freyer suggests that Story drafted his opinion so as best to cultivate the narrow strip of ground he held in common with the Jacksonians. 18 He did not directly pose the issue of how far the rival law-making authority of the federal courts extended. Instead, he framed the holding by characterizing the commercial law question as a matter of "general" law. From that conclusion, he reasoned that the Rules of Decision Act did not require state decisions on point to be followed because application was limited to state laws strictly local that is to say, to the positive statutes of the state, and the construction thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and titles to things having a permanent locality . . . . It never has been supposed by us, that the section did apply, or was designed to apply, to questions of a more general nature, . . . . 19 Whatever the faults of the approach, bottoming the decision on a characterization of the issue as one of general, rather than local, law invoked "a distinction . . . which was familiar to antebellum lawyers and judges" and one which "did not of itself challenge the states' rights values of [Justices] Daniel, Taney, and others" (p. 36).
Freyer finds support for his thesis in the manner in which Sw(ft v.
Tyson was received. He observes that the opinion was the subject of favorable commentary concerning its commercial law analysis and that no mention was made of Sw[ft's interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act (pp. 17-18). Grant Gilmore reached a similar conclusion and offered a further perspective on Sw[ft:
The point about Sw!ft v. Tyson is that it was immediately and enthusiastically accepted. No one suggested that it was an unconstitutional usurpation of power by power-crazed judges or that it was a trick played by a wily Federalist justice on his unsuspecting Jacksonian colleagues .... On the contrary, the doctrine of the general commercial law was warmly welcomed and expansively construed, not only by the lower federal courts but by the state courts as well. For the next half century the Supreme Court of the United States became a great commercial law court.20
Freyer's conception of Story's intent in Sw[ft stands up well, I
was loosely related to the Jacksonian ideology of the period." Note,supra note 14, at 300. This is hardly compatible with the reverence displayed for ''the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence" in Swfft. 41 U.S. at 19.
18. "Cotton planters such as [Justice] Daniel, as much as commercially oriented justices like Story, understood the importance of uniform commercial rules to the smooth operation of the antebellum credit system. Presented with a case that embodied no direct federal-state issue, the justices were free to decide the commercial questions accordingly." P. 43 (footnote omitted).
19. 41 U.S. at 18 (emphasis added). impossible that he could have foreseen, much less orchestrated, the effects the Sw!ft doctrine would ultimately have. Story's nationalist reveries never led him to suggest that federal courts had anything approaching exclusive jurisdiction over commercial law cases. 30 It was only after postbellum changes in the scope and application of federal diversity jurisdiction that massive inroads on the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts became possible. 31 As the force of Sw!ft as a commercial precedent declined, it began to take on a new and more disturbing significance. Discussion of "general" and "local" law in Sw!ft left many points of law unaccounted for and usually it was the general law category into which new problems were placed. 32 Even more troublesome was the tendency of tlie Supreme Court to displace state law even within the sanctuary of "local" matters originally defined in Sw!ft. 33 The Sw!ft doctrine, though it never was without champions, grew increasingly unpopular. The formalistic jurisprudence of characterization -exemplified by the supposed distinction between general and local law -was to face growing skepticism in the twentieth century. 34 The problems with Sw!ft, however, went deeper than jurisprudential style.
The "general law" exception to the Rules of Decision Act led to the creation of an expanding body of general federal common law. Corporations, an enormous new class of litigants, 35 regarded the difference between rights conferred under general federal common law and those recognized by state courts as an advantage. 36 Through judicious selection of the place of incorporation (pp. 102-10), a corporation was frequently able to insure that suits by or against it would be litigated by a federal court exercising its diversity jurisdic- 231 (1973) , or that Story might have gone further than his opinion in Swift to achieve a kind of national/aw merchant ifhe could have taken the Court with him. P. 13;seealso note 16supra. tion. 37 The most famous example of this manipulative use of Sw!ft doctrine and federal diversity jurisdiction was in Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co. 38 In this federal diversity proceeding, the Supreme Court permitted the plaintiff to enforce in Kentucky a contract which under Kentucky state law was void as against public policy. Originally, plaintiff and defendant had both been Kentucky corporations. Plaintiff created federal diversity jurisdiction before suit by dissolving the Kentucky Corporation and reincorporating in Tennessee. It has been suggested that the facts of Black and White Taxicab were so blatant that it was open to the Supreme Court to refuse jurisdiction without renouncing Sw!ft. 39 It may have been better, however, for the case to have been decided the way it was, for the egregious facts of the case and the "enormous criticism" (p. 105) that the decision evoked may have had a purgative effect upon the Court. Erie was to follow in a decade. 40 Meanwhile, "the Court drew back from further extensions of the Sw!ft doctrine" (p. 106). Finally, Black and White Taxicab provided Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone an opportunity to join in the last and most famous of a line of principled and visionary dissents which were to herald the coming of Erie. 41 Though the outline of events between Sw!ft and Erie was already understood, Freyer contributes something by pulling information heretofore found in scattered sources into a single narrative. However, his more interesting and original contributions at this point of the book are his suggestions concerning how changing conceptions oflaw and sources oflegal authority contributed to the criticism and eventual demise of the Sw!ft doctrine. It is at least arguable that Sw!ft sought to secure for federal judges no more than a view of general principles of law unobstructed by conflicting state judicial precedents. Freyer suggests that this conception began to seem amorphous and, to some, disingenuous only when, after the Civil War, the metaphysical foundation of the belief in gen-37. In 1875, corporations were aided by congressional enlargement of the scope of general diversity jurisdiction and removal. P. 55. 38. 276 U.S. 518 (1928) 39. C. WRIGHT, supra note 11, at 351. It is important to remember that, when Erie did overrule Sw[fi, it deprived corporations of their greatest gain from manipulating diversity jurisdiction but did not bar the manipulation itself. Finally, in 1958, Congress acted to stem these abuses by extending the citizenship of a corporation to the additional state, if any, ''where it has its principal place of business." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976) . See C. WRIGHT, supra note 11, at 129. [Vol. 82:869 eral standards back of all legal rules seems to have been eroded. Undermining this belief was a growing perception that legal principles were in fact nothing more than doctrines found in the local law of the state, or in the national common law .... .
Holmes may have said it best in his famous observation: "The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign . . . . "42 What sovereign has or should have authority to create rules of decision to govern federal diversity cases? Skirted in the Swift decision itself, 43 this question had become a favorite both of those condemning the Swift doctrine and those defending it. The argument that federal courts acting under Swift usurped state lawmaking authority was made forcefully in Supreme Court dissents, 44 by members of academe (pp. 87-92) and in . On the other side of the debate, "the Court increasingly based its common-law authority" under the Swift doctrine "on constitutional principle" (p. 74). Some members of academe supported the preeminence of federal sovereignty as well (p. 118-19) .
Erie v. Tompkins overruled Swift's interpretation of the Rule of Decision Act. Justice Brandeis stated:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general common law. 45 Freyer spends relatively little of the book focusing upon the 42. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222, (1917) Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 268, 273 (1946) (citing Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) ).
While Freyer clearly grasps the distinction between federal general common law and federal common law, see pp. xv, 25, he is not always careful to observe it in the book, referring to federal general common law as "federal common law," see pp. 94, 107. Moreover, he overstates the importance of the true federal common law which survived Erie, suggesting it has become a centralizing force which threatens "to overturn the decentralist intent of the Erie opinion . Court's decision in . This may be, in part, because virtually every aspect of Erie -for example, the true importance of Professor Warren's research, 46 or the choice between the approaches of Brandeis and Reed to overruling Sw!ft 47 -has been so thoroughly explored before. Part of the reason may also be Preyer's apparent interest in winding the book up without proceeding to questions concerning application of the Rules of Decision Act which have plagued courts and commentators since Erie.
When I :finished the book I found the chronological point at which Freyer chose to end it premature and arbitrary. Do not contemporary questions about Erie's reach also set up, to use Preyer's words, a "tension between harmony and dissonance" touching "the very essence of American Federalism," concerning "a determination of the limits of power of state and national government" (p. 160)? On further reflection, and in fairness to Freyer, I think the answer is no.
It 51-52, 81-88, 108 (1923 The Erie case left in its train many unresolved questions . . . . But the questions were left to be resolved as questions only of choice between state law and federal law. The case put a period, with an exclamation point, to the notion that the decisional rules of the state courts had a status inferior to state statutes in the spheres, whatever they were, in which state law govemed. 51 It was not unreasonable for Freyer to place the last period in his manuscript at about the same place. Policies of federalism may figure in the contemporary resolution of post-Erie issues but the politics of federalism have become inaudible. Federal courts no longer do much, if any, violence to state substantive law. 52 Erie marks the boundary line and Freyer is justified in not taking his readers across.
